United States v. Anderegg (7th Cir. 2026): Private Possession vs. Production of AI-Generated Material

Educational Purposes Only: This post provides general information about Indiana/federal law. It is not legal advice. Laws change and how they apply depends on specific facts. Source links are to published cases so you can read the law yourself.

This post gives a breakdown of the ruling in United States v. Anderegg, No. 25-1354 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026). It does not cover every possible legal scenario or precedent.

The law on this topic is primarily found in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002), and United States v. Anderegg, No. 25-1354 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026).

There will be no descriptions of the involved images.

Note: The 7th Circuit applies to Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.

Facts:

Steven Anderegg was charged with producing, distributing, and possessing depictions of sexually explicit conduct between minors and sharing it with an individual under the age of sixteen. The depictions were created with a generative artificial intelligence software that allowed him to create realistic images of prepubescent children engaging in sexual acts. This was done on Anderegg’s personal laptop.

Anderegg’s Argument:

Anderegg moved to dismiss the charges under the argument that it’s a protected activity under the First Amendment and precedent.

What the court said and why:

The court did dismiss one of the charges, which was possession. The government conceded the images for the possession count do not depict an actual child and cannot be linked to an actual child. It gets confusing once we get into why they dismissed only the possession charge, so we’ll look at both of the main precedents used in this case.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969): This case determined that you have the right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of your own home. The argument is that in Anderegg’s case, it is child sex abuse material (CSAM), so this ruling should not be applicable.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002): This case determined that virtual child pornography doesn’t automatically count as real child pornography. This case was decided in 2002. At that time, child pornography wasn’t the same thing as obscene material. Congress had originally defined child pornography as anything that appears to be a minor engaging in explicit behavior. The Supreme Court found this too wide of a definition because it wasn’t real children and the behavior depicted wasn’t obscene. Congress then changed it so that they weren’t banning explicit child behavior, but obscenity. Obscenity has never been protected speech EXCEPT privately in your home.

Summary:

To put it simply, we should word it like this. Were the obscene virtual images created? Then it isn’t protected. Were they distributed? Then it’s not protected. Were they transferred to a minor? Also not protected. Privately possessed in their home and does not depict a real child? Protected under Stanley v. Georgia and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.

What does this mean for Indiana?

IC 35-42-4-4 actually includes computer generated images. Anderegg’s case was involving a federal obscenity statute. If someone was charged under IC 35-42-4-4, the statute would still be applicable unless they raised a first amendment challenge and an Indiana judge ruled the same way that was ruled in this case, or the United States Supreme Court ruled on it.

Food for Thought:

Something to consider is that it would be impossible for someone to possess virtual obscene images of children engaging in obscene activities without someone involved being in legal trouble. Perhaps the person in possession wouldn’t be in trouble, but whoever shared and/or created it will be.