Indiana’s First Halloween Under SEA 119: The New Event Ban in IC 35-42-4-14

Educational Purposes Only: This post provides general information about Indiana law. It is not legal advice. Laws change and how they apply depends on specific facts. Source links are to iga.in.gov and published Indiana cases so you can read the law yourself.

This post gives a general overview of the new event ban law impacting sex offenders and where that law is found in the Indiana Code. It does not cover a specific case. It also does not cover every section of Indiana’s sex offender registration laws. Sex offender registration in Indiana is covered in several chapters, including IC 11-8-8 and IC 35-38-1.

The law on this topic is primarily found in Indiana Code Title 35, Article 42, Chapter 4, Section 14 and Senate Enrolled Act 119. You can read the current version on the official Indiana General Assembly site: IGA | 2026 Indiana Code.

Old Law vs. New Law, what changed?

Prior to July of 2026, laws on where sex offenders couldn’t go were pretty limited. IC 35-42-4-14 used to just cover unlawful entry of school property. Since SEA 119 was passed, it now also covers locations or facilities holding events primarily directed to children.

Old:

IC 35-42-4-14(b)(1): A serious sex offender who knowingly or intentionally enters school property commits a Level 6 felony.

New:

IC 35-42-4-14(b)(2): A serious sex offender who knowingly or intentionally enters a facility or location holding an event that provides entertainment or programming primarily directed toward a child less than eighteen (18) years of age; commits unlawful entry by a serious sex offender, a Level 6 felony.

Please note: It’s important to note that the language used in this statute is “serious sex offender”. That means they must be registered as a sexually violent predator (SVP) or be convicted of one of the charges listed under IC 35-42-4-14. Read the statute its entirety for that full list.

IC 35-31.5-2-127.7: "Facility or event that provides entertainment or programming primarily directed toward a child less than eighteen (18) years of age"

"Facility or event that provides entertainment or programming primarily directed toward a child less than eighteen (18) years of age", or "facility or location holding an event that provides entertainment or programming primarily directed toward a child less than eighteen (18) years of age", means a facility, location, or event for which admission, participation, or attendance is restricted by policy or practice to children less than eighteen (18) years of age, or to children less than eighteen (18) years of age accompanied by a parent, guardian, or custodian.

Challenges:

This may sound like a great change, but prosecutors will face some challenges when attempting to prosecute under this new law.

When you’re reading a law and thinking about it from an attorney’s point of view, you’re thinking about the elements of the crime. It’s almost like a math problem. In this statute, the elements would be a serious sex offender + knowingly or intentionally + enters a facility or location + holding an event that provides entertainment primarily directed to a child less than 18 = commits unlawful entry by a serious sex offender.

To the regular person hearing about this law, it may sound like sex offenders can’t pass out candy on Halloween, go to a haunted house, etc. when in reality, in order for a charge like this to be successful it needs to be an event held at a facility or certain location that is explicitly for children (and/or an accompanying adult) and that policy needs to be enforced through something such as registration.

A prosecutor will need to be able to prove that the offender knew or intentionally entered the location. If it’s not clear that the event is only for children under 18, it won’t stick.

In reality, we don’t fully know how successful of a change this law will cause because as of October 2026, I have been unable to locate any cases with someone charged under the new statute in Westlaw (a legal research database) or news platforms, only unlawful entry of school property.

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